

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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4 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Efforts to Put Pressure on
the Reagan Administration

1. Attached is a revised version of [] paper portraying draft recommendations from Arbatov to Gorbachev's assistant (Alexandrov) on ways the Soviets could--without going through a major policy decision--capitalize on public perceptions stimulated by the leadership change in the USSR. We have incorporated the ideas you and others have offered (the Afghan political action idea, for example, is in paragraph 5) and tightened the language. 25X1

2. Also attached is a draft text you could use in a covering note. As a precaution against the possibility that in subsequent--perhaps hand to hand--distribution, the covering note might get separated from the memo, we also have added a caveat line at the top of the first page to warn the reader that

This memorandum was prepared by [] the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to []
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this is not the real thing. (Although something like it may well exist!)

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Douglas J. MacEachin

Attachments:

Draft Recommendations
Proposed Text for Covering Memo



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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Efforts to Put Pressure on the Reagan Administration

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DDI/SOVA/ [redacted] (4 April 85)

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The following was prepared by a CIA Senior Analyst of Soviet Affairs as a policy recommendation a Soviet apparatchik might convey to the Politburo.

Draft Memorandum:

FROM: Georgiy Arbatov
Director of USA and Canada Institute
CPSU Central Committee Member

TO: Andrei Aleksandrov-Argentov
Assistant, General-Secretary, CPSU

1. With the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, we have successfully and dramatically breached the generational divide--and reaped huge international dividends. Our efforts to portray Gorbachev as a decisive, formidable, and tough-minded leader have been accepted by international opinion almost without exception. While we have more important fish to fry at home in terms of personnel policy, defense spending, and investment strategy, it is vital that we not lose the momentum that has been established. I have listed a series of measures to serve that objective, and there are also steps that Gorbachev can take personally, including a trip to the United Nations in the fall (with a Cuban stopover), a summit with Rajiv Gandhi in India later in the year, and discussions in Vietnam in early 1986. No General Secretary has travelled outside the Bloc since 1981, and we must show Gorbachev as an active player on the international scene. Having successfully used propaganda to create a favorable image of Gorbachev, we should now devote our energies to manipulating public opinion in the United States in order to put the Reagan administration on the defensive. We can tantalize prominent US businessmen with a variety of long-term economic deals, including the prospect of equity ownership in off-shore oil deals. It takes very few exit permissions for the refuseniks to reach the editorial pages of the few important newspapers in the United States. And the suggestion of more specificity in our arms packages in Geneva will appeal to the arms control community in Washington and New York. In the meantime, there are a series of low-cost steps that can be taken to make life more difficult for Washington.

2. Internal: Modest changes at home would be the easiest way to manipulate Western media accounts. Following our signing of the provisions on human rights in the 1975 Helsinki CSCE accords, we successfully used harsh measures to undermine dissident ties with foreigners and contain the activities of nonconformists in our society. These measures caused very little disruption to our state-to-state ties, but, conversely, any easing of these tactics would garner a tremendous amount of attention in the West and possibly create US domestic pressures for change in Soviet-American relations.

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- Any improvement in conditions for our most famous dissident, Andrey Sakharov, would resonate throughout West Europe and the United States.
- The release of Shcharansky or Orlov would weaken the intensity of the international condemnation of our efforts to stem the tide of dissent.
- We could increase Jewish emigration and reduce pressure on Jewish dissidents, particularly limiting the sentence of a high-visibility dissident such as Iosif Begun. This might sway the US Congress on a variety of national security and defense issues of interest to us.

Internal personnel changes should be announced with an eye to exploiting the Western obsession with our generation gap. Sovietologists in the West believe that any change, ipso facto, means that a reactionary oligarch has been replaced by a pragmatic reformer. Similarly, our anti-corruption campaign and mid-level discussion of economic reforms never fails to get cited in Western media as examples of policy developments favorable to Western interests.

3. Arms Control: We should continue to keep our intentions on arms control elusive. Nevertheless, a greater amount of specificity on our arms control proposals would put pressure on Washington to be more forthcoming. Thus, we should closely watch the parliamentary debate in Washington on strategic weapons and in the Hague on INF to look for targets of opportunity for our own initiatives.

- In order to prevent further NATO INF deployments, particularly in the Netherlands, we could offer to stop SS-20 deployments and to withdraw our SS-12 missiles from East Europe if NATO agrees to reduce Pershing-II deployment. We could hint at dropping the INF link to British/French modernization. The Dutch peace movement should get detailed briefings from us.
- In turn, we could link any ostensible conciliation on INF to the need to restrict SDI, which would make a favorable impression on West European audiences. We might also imply to British and French audiences that, if the USSR is forced to counter the SDI, then UK and French nuclear forces ultimately would become ineffective as deterrents. In any event, we must step up the campaign against SDI.
- We may have to compromise on space-based defensive systems by allowing research to continue but forbidding

anti-satellite weapons testing. The international community will support our efforts to get a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and can be counted on to emphasize any of Washington's rejections of our initiatives.

- We could exacerbate existing strains between the US and its European allies in the MBFR and CDE negotiations by being somewhat more forthcoming on so-called verification and confidence building measures. This would strengthen the hand of those Europeans attracted to our overall proposals but unable to overcome US resistance based on claims of verification problems.

The major objectives in any of these moves would be to stroke a European audience, to appeal to the European media and thus create wedge-driving opportunities between the US and its allies. We could create a more favorable environment for these initiatives in Europe by putting the "revanchism" issue on the backburner and appearing to be more supportive of inner-German relations. Indeed, we could hold inner-German ties hostage to Kohl's willingness to serve as a US proxy in Europe. Mitterand's political weakness at home should make him vulnerable to pressure tactics as well.

4. Regional: Various Third World situations provide openings for us to gain a favorable press merely by reformulating previous initiatives. In these cases, we would be trying to demonstrate a new dynamism, provide an alternative or counter to US policy, place Washington in the position of opposing "peaceful" solutions, and underscore our claims to regional influence.

- The best possibility for attracting international attention would be a renewed call for an Afghan political settlement on the basis of UN-sponsored talks that are scheduled to reconvene in May. Any hint of readiness on our part to reach a political settlement would be well-received in Europe, Pakistan, India and perhaps the US.
- We have little to lose in trying to play a mediating role in the Iran-Iraq war, similar to our successful mediation of the Indo-Pak war at Tashkent in 1965. Any effort would reinforce our peace credentials and underscore our claims to a role in the region.
- In order to make sure that the recent Hussein-Arafat talks do not lead to the revival of the Camp David process, we could renew our call for an international conference on the Middle East with a role for the PLO in the negotiations.

-- As a means to weaken US policy in the Caribbean Basin, especially regarding Nicaragua, we should increase our public support of the Contadora process. This will make it tougher on the Reagan administration by contributing to the conflict between the White House and Congress on support for the contras.

-- In Southern Africa, we merely have to continue to stress ongoing UN resolutions as well as the futility of dealing with the South Africans. As we do with respect to the situation in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon, we should emphasize US links to the violence-prone regime in South Africa. We could simultaneously increase our support for Mozambique to demonstrate our commitment to those facing South African-backed aggression.

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6. Third World Policy: We should be particularly mindful of the US connection in selecting Asian and Third World countries for pressure tactics. We should focus on those countries that still harbor profound anticolonial feelings toward the West (e.g. Egypt, Zimbabwe), house a significant US military presence (e.g. Greece, Japan, Philippines), or are vulnerable to the military superiority of such US "proxies" as South Africa and Israel (e.g. Angola, Jordan). Since the rift with China has been a source of weakness for us in the international arena, we must concentrate on improving ties to Beijing.

-- We should follow a dual policy with Pakistan because of its security vulnerability as well as its links to both China and the United States. On the one hand, we could

offer Afghan recognition of the Afghan-Pakistan border in return for Islamabad's recognition of the Karmal regime; on the other hand, Soviet-Afghan border incursions and Soviet-Indian pressure tactics will undermine Zia's confidence in security commitments from the US.

- Greece and the Philippines are attractive targets because of their security relationships with the US, the instability of their governments, and mounting opposition to US military bases. Gestures aimed at the Papandreu and Marcos governments would attract a good deal of media attention and discomfit Washington. We should also be more active in Japan. We cannot return the Northern Territories but Gromyko could go to Tokyo and at least listen to the Japanese position. We should dangle joint ventures in front of the Japanese, particularly the possibility of sharing in off-shore oil.
- Changing regional circumstances, particularly New Zealand's challenge to the ANZUS treaty framework, are providing a more fertile ground for our presence in the South Pacific. Economic inroads are likely in Kuribati and Tuvalu in the next twelve months, and we have already challenged Western and Japanese exclusivity in the region.
- We should pursue a closer Sino-Soviet dialogue and improved economic ties if only to worsen the US position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle. We should try to reestablish personal contacts with key Chinese leaders. The restoration of party-to-party ties or a Beijing summit would bring a halt to US efforts to use China against us. The military leadership will kick and scream, but we can afford to withdraw a division or two from Mongolia.

We may want to flaunt the vigor of Gorbachev's leadership by challenging the status quo in selected areas provoking a crisis. Our restrictions on Berlin air corridors and military liaison mission travel already have reminded the West of its vulnerability; more serious challenges can be threatened if East-West relations do not develop favorably from our point of view. We are also in a position to supply more sophisticated weapons to Nicaragua, North Korea, and Vietnam in order to alter international perceptions of the regional balance of power.

Prospects

7 We have already used the succession to project to the outside world an image of continuity and steadfastness in

policy. The speed with which the General Secretary was appointed, his assertion of a leading role in policy, and the self-confident rhetoric of the leadership on international issues were cited in international media as reflections of real strength and potential flexibility in policy that were not present in Brezhnev's final days and in the regimes of his two immediate successors. We must continue to project toughness and decisiveness during the current period, and to signal that the USSR remains determined to use its global reach to compete with the US across the board. At the same time, we will want to suggest that we have high cards of our own to play if the current competition with the United States is carried to a higher plateau--or to convince an international audience that the USSR's efforts to improve ties with the United States are not being reciprocated. Western media often will be the transmitting agent for these signals. The impact of this activity will be to make life more difficult for the Reagan administration.

Proposed Text for Covering Note

The accession to power of a new, dynamic leader in the Soviet Union presents an opportunity for Moscow to undertake initiatives designed to put the United States on the defensive. The Soviets have already gained a propaganda windfall from the accession and power of a genuinely different leader, and they presumably realize that his moves and statements will be treated favorably by the international media. Moscow is likely to seek to capitalize on this situation by undertaking an activist policy designed to steal a march on the U.S. Such a policy probably would mix the tough with the conciliatory and would cover every aspect of Soviet policy: bilaterals with the US, internal, regional, and arms control. Actions would be calibrated to gain maximum advantage from General Secretary Gorbachev's novel position--and the great interest and anticipation of Western news media--without changing basic policies and positions. One of our senior analysts of Soviet affairs has attempted to look at this situation through the eyes of a Soviet apparatchik, and has prepared the attached as recommendations such an apparatchik might convey to the Politburo.

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